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Investigations of acute infectious disease
outbreaks are very common, and the results of
such investigations are often published;
however, surprisingly little has been written
about the actual procedures followed during
such investigations (1,2). Most epidemiologists
and public health officials learn the procedures
by conducting investigations with the initial
assistance of more experienced colleagues. This
article outlines the general approach to
conducting an outbreak investigation. The
approach applies not only to infectious disease
outbreaks but also to outbreaks due to
noninfectious causes (e.g., toxic exposure).
How Outbreaks Are Recognized
Possible outbreaks of disease come to the
attention of public health officials in various
ways. Often, an astute clinician, infection control
nurse, or clinical laboratory worker first notices
an unusual disease or an unusual number of
cases of a disease and alerts public health
officials. For example, staphylococcal toxic shock
syndrome and eosinophilia myalgia syndrome
were first noted by clinicians (3,4). Frequently, it
is the patient (or someone close to the patient)
who first suspects a problem, as is often the case
in foodborne outbreaks after a shared meal and
as was the case in the investigation of a cluster of
cases of apparent juvenile rheumatoid arthritis
near Lyme, Connecticut, which led to the
discovery of Lyme disease (5). Review of routinely
collected surveillance data can also detect
outbreaks of known diseases, as in the case of
hepatitis B infection among the patients of an oral
surgeon in Connecticut and patients at a weight
reduction clinic (6,7). The former outbreak was
first suspected when routinely submitted
communicable disease report forms for several
patients from one small town indicated that all
of the patients had recently had oral surgery.
However, it is relatively uncommon for
outbreaks to be detected in this way and even
more uncommon for them to be detected in this
way while they are still in progress. Finally,
sometimes public health officials learn about
outbreaks of disease from the local newspaper
or television news.
Reasons for Investigating Outbreaks
The most compelling reason to investigate a
recognized outbreak of disease is that exposure to
the source(s) of infection may be continuing; by
identifying and eliminating the source of
infection, we can prevent additional cases. For
example, if cans of mushrooms containing
botulinum toxin are still on store shelves or in
homes or restaurants, their recall and destruc-
tion can prevent further cases of botulism.
However, even if an outbreak is essentially
over by the time the epidemiologic investigation
begins—that is, if no one is being further exposed
to the source of infection—investigating the
outbreak may still be indicated for many reasons.
Foremost is that the results of the investigation
may lead to recommendations or strategies for
preventing similar future outbreaks. For
example, a Legionnaires’ disease outbreak
investigation may produce recommendations
for grocery store misting machine use that may
prevent other outbreaks (8). Other reasons for
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investigating outbreaks are the opportunity to 1)
describe new diseases and learn more about known
diseases; 2) evaluate existing prevention strategies,
e.g., vaccines; 3) teach (and learn) epidemiology;
and 4) address public concern about the outbreak.
Once a decision is made to investigate an
outbreak, three types of activities are generally
involved—the epidemiologic investigation; the
environmental investigation; and the interaction
with the public, the press, and, in many
instances, the legal system. While these activities
often occur simultaneously throughout the
investigation, it is conceptually easier to consider
each of them separately.
Epidemiologic Investigation
Outbreak investigations are, in theory,
indistinguishable from other epidemiologic in-
vestigations; however, outbreak investigations
encounter more constraints. 1) If the outbreak is
ongoing at the time of the investigation, there is
great urgency to find the source and prevent
additional cases. 2) Because outbreak investiga-
tions frequently are public, there is substantial
pressure to conclude them rapidly, particularly if
the outbreak is ongoing. 3) In many outbreaks,
the number of cases available for study is limited;
therefore, the statistical power of the investiga-
tion is limited. 4) Early media reports concerning
the outbreak may bias the responses of persons
subsequently interviewed. 5) Because of legal
liability and the financial interests of persons and
institutions involved, there is pressure to
conclude the investigation quickly, which may
lead to hasty decisions regarding the source of the
outbreak. 6) If detection of the outbreak is delayed,
useful clinical and environmental samples may be
very difficult or impossible to obtain.
Outbreak investigations have essential com-
ponents as follows: 1) establish case definition(s);
2) confirm that cases are “real”; 3) establish the
background rate of disease; 4) find cases, decide if
there is an outbreak, define scope of the outbreak;
5) examine the descriptive epidemiologic features
of the cases; 6) generate hypotheses; 7) test
hypotheses; 8) collect and test environmental
samples; 9) implement control measures; and 10)
interact with the press, inform the public. While
the first seven components are listed in logical
order, in most outbreak investigations, many
occur more or less simultaneously. The impor-
tance of these components may vary depending
on the circumstances of a specific outbreak.
Case Definition
In some outbreaks, formulating the case
definition(s) and exclusion criteria is straightfor-
ward; for example, in an outbreak of gastroenteri-
tis caused by Salmonella infection, a laboratory-
confirmed case would be defined as a culture-
confirmed infection with Salmonella or perhaps
with Salmonella of the particular serotype
causing the outbreak, while a clinical case
definition might be new onset of diarrhea. In
other outbreaks, the case definition and exclusion
criteria are complex, particularly if the disease is
new and the range of clinical manifestations is
unknown (e.g., in a putative outbreak of chronic
fatigue syndrome). In many outbreak investiga-
tions, multiple case definitions are used (e.g.,
laboratory-confirmed case vs. clinical case; definite
vs. probable vs. possible case; outbreak-associated
case vs. nonoutbreak-associated case, primary case
vs. secondary case) and the resulting data are
analyzed by using different case definitions.
When the number of cases available for study is
not a limiting factor and a case-control study is
being used to examine risk factors for becoming
a case, a strict case definition is often
preferable to increase specificity and reduce
misclassification of disease status (i.e., reduce
the chance of including cases of unrelated
illness or no illness as outbreak-related cases).
Case Confirmation
In certain outbreaks, clinical findings in
reported cases should be reviewed closely, either
directly, by examining the patients, or indirectly,
by detailed review of the medical records and
discussion with the attending health-care
provider(s), especially when a new disease
appears to be emerging (e.g., in the early
investigations of Legionnaires’ disease, AIDS,
eosinophilia myalgia syndrome, and hantavirus
pulmonary syndrome) (4,9-11). Clinical findings
should also be examined closely when some or all
of the observed cases may be factitious, perhaps
because of laboratory error (12); a discrepancy
between the clinical and laboratory findings
generally exists, which may be discernible only
by a detailed review of the clinical findings.
Establishing the Background Rate of Disease
and Finding Cases
Once it is clear that a suspected outbreak is
not the result of laboratory error, a set of
activities should be undertaken to establish the23 Vol. 4, No. 1, January–March 1998 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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background rate of the disease in the affected
population and to find all the cases in a given
population in a certain period. This set of
activities should prove that the observed
number of cases truly is in excess of the “usual”
number (i.e., that an outbreak has occurred),
define the scope of the outbreak geographically
and temporally, find cases to describe the
epidemiologic features of those affected and to
include them in analytic epidemiologic studies
(see below) or, most often, accomplish a
combination of these goals.
When hundreds of acute onset diarrhea cases
are suddenly seen daily in a single outpatient
setting (10), an outbreak is clearly occurring. On
the other hand, when too many hospitalized
patients are dying unexpectedly of cardiac arrest
(13) or the number of cases of listeriosis in a given
county in recent months is moderately elevated,
it may be necessary to establish the background
rates in the population to determine whether an
outbreak is occurring. In such situations, the period
and geographic areas involved would provide the
most useful baseline data, keeping in mind that the
labor and time required to collect such information
is often directly proportional to the length of the
period and the size of the geographic area selected.
Because disease incidence normally fluctuates by
season, data from comparable seasons in earlier
years should be included.
Establishing the background rate of a disease
is generally more straightforward if confirmatory
tests are available than if laboratory tests are
unavailable or infrequently used. The rate of
certain invasive bacterial infections (e.g., listerio-
sis and meningococcal infections) in a given area
can be easily documented by reviewing the
records of hospital clinical microbiology laborato-
ries; however, cases for which specimens were not
submitted to these laboratories for testing will go
undetected. When a disease is less frequently
laboratory-confirmed because health-care pro-
viders may not have considered the diagnosis or
ordered the appropriate laboratory tests (e.g., for
Legionnaires’ disease), establishing the back-
ground rate of disease in a community or a
hospital suspected of having an outbreak
generally requires alternative case-finding strat-
egies and is almost invariably more labor
intensive. In an outbreak of a new disease,
substantial effort is often necessary to determine
whether or not cases of that disease had been
occurring but had gone unrecognized.
Once data concerning the background rate of
a disease (including case-finding for the current
period) have been collected, it is generally
possible to determine whether or not an outbreak
is occurring or has occurred, although in some
situations it may remain unclear whether or not
the number of cases observed exceeds the
background rate. In part, the problem may relate
to how an outbreak is defined. To paraphrase a
U.S. Supreme Court justice speaking about
pornography, “I can’t define an outbreak, but I
know one when I see one.” Thus, it may be
difficult to detect and prove the existence of small
outbreaks, but large ones are self-evident.
An outbreak can also be difficult to identify
when during the period under study changes
occur in the care-seeking behavior and access to
care of patients; the level of suspicion, referral
patterns, and test-ordering practices of health-
care providers; the diagnostic tests and other
procedures used by laboratories; and the
prevalence of underlying immunosuppressive
conditions or other host factors in the population.
All these factors, which can affect the apparent
incidence of a disease and produce artifactual
changes perceived as increases (or decreases) in
the actual incidence, need to be considered when
interpreting the findings.
Descriptive Epidemiology
By collecting patient data, the case-finding
activities provide extremely important informa-
tion concerning the descriptive epidemiologic
features of the outbreak. By reviewing and
plotting on an “epidemic curve” the times of onset
of the cases and by examining the characteristics
(e.g., age, sex, race/ethnicity, residence, occupa-
tion, recent travel, or attendance at events) of the
ill persons, investigators can often generate
hypotheses concerning the cause(s)/source(s) of
the outbreak. While linking the sudden onset of
gastroenteritis among scores of persons who
attended a church supper to the single common
meal they shared is generally not a challenge, an
otherwise cryptic source can be at least hinted at
by the descriptive epidemiologic features of the
cases involved. For example, in a particularly
perplexing outbreak of Salmonella Muenchen
infections ultimately traced to contaminated
marijuana, the age distribution of the affected
persons and of their households was markedly
different from that typically seen for salmonello-
sis (14). Or, similarly, in the outbreak of24 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 4, No. 1, January–March 1998
Perspectives
legionellosis due to contaminated misting
machines in the produce section of a grocery
store, before the link to this exposure was even
suspected, it was noted that women constituted a
substantially higher proportion of the cases
usually seen with this disease (5). The shape of
the epidemic curve can also be very instructive,
suggesting a point-source epidemic, ongoing
transmission, or a combination of the two.
Generating a Hypothesis
The source(s) and route(s) of exposure must
be determined to understand why an outbreak
occurred, how to prevent similar outbreaks in the
future, and, if the outbreak is ongoing, how to
prevent others from being exposed to the
source(s) of infection. In some outbreaks, the
source and route are obvious to those involved in
the outbreak and to the investigators. However,
even when the source of exposure appears
obvious at the outset, a modicum of skepticism
should be retained because the obvious answer is
not invariably correct. For example, in an
outbreak of nosocomial legionellosis in Rhode
Island, the results of an earlier investigation into
a small number of hospital-acquired cases at the
same hospital had demonstrated that Legionella
pneumophila was in the hospital potable water
supply, and a sudden increase in new cases was
strongly believed to be related to the potable
water (15). However, a detailed epidemiologic
investigation implicated a new cooling tower at
the hospital as the source of the second outbreak.
While the true source of exposure, or at least
a relatively short list of possibilities, is apparent
in many outbreaks, this is not the case in the more
challenging outbreaks. In these instances, hypoth-
eses concerning the source/route of exposure can be
generated in a number of ways beyond a detailed
review of the descriptive epidemiologic findings. A
review of existing epidemiologic, microbiologic, and
veterinary data is very useful for learning about
known and suspected sources of previous outbreaks
or sporadic cases of a given infection or disease, as
well as the ecologic niche of an infectious agent.
Thus, in an outbreak of invasive Streptococcus
zooepidemicus infections in New Mexico due to
consumption of soft cheese made from contami-
nated raw milk, the investigation focused on
exposure to dairy products and animals because of
previous microbiologic and veterinary studies (16).
A review of existing data generally only helps
confirm what is already known about a particular
disease and is far less helpful in identifying
totally new and unsuspected sources or routes of
infection (i.e., marijuana as a source of
Salmonella). When neither review of the
descriptive epidemiologic features of the cases
nor review of existing scientific information
yields the correct hypothesis, other methods can
be used to generate hypotheses about what the
patients have in common. Open-ended interviews
of those infected (or their surrogates) are one
such method in which investigators try to identify
all possibly relevant exposures (e.g., a list of all
foods consumed) during a given period. For
example, in an investigation of Yersinia
enterocolitica infections in young children in
Belgium, open-ended interviews of the mothers
of some of the ill children showed that many gave
their children raw pork sausage as a weaning
food, providing the first clue as to the source of
these infections (17). Similarly, in two outbreaks
of foodborne listeriosis, a variant of this process
led to the identification of the source of the
outbreak. In one of these outbreaks, a search of
the refrigerator of one of the case-patients who,
as a visitor to the area, had had very limited
exposure to foods there, suggested cole slaw as a
possible vehicle of infection (18). In the other
outbreak, an initial case-control study found no
differences between cases and controls regarding
exposure to a number of specific food items but
showed that case households were more likely
than control households to buy their food at a
particular foodstore chain. To generate a list of
other possible food sources of infection, investiga-
tors shopped with persons who did the shopping
for case households and compiled a list of foods
purchased at that foodstore chain that had not
been reported in the previous study. This
approach implicated pasteurized milk from that
chain as the source of the outbreak (19).
In some particularly perplexing outbreaks,
bringing together a subset of the patients to
discuss their experiences and exposures in a way
that may reveal unidentified links can be useful.
Testing the Hypothesis
Whether a hypothesis explaining the occur-
rence of an outbreak is easy or difficult to generate,
an analytic epidemiologic study to test the proposed
hypothesis should be considered. While in many
instances a case-control study is used, other
designs, including retrospective cohort and cross-
sectional studies, can be equally or more25 Vol. 4, No. 1, January–March 1998 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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appropriate. The goal of all these studies is to assess
the relationship between a given exposure and the
disease under study. Thus, each exposure of
interest (e.g., each of the meals eaten together by
passengers on a cruise ship and each of the foods
and beverages served at those meals) constitutes a
separate hypothesis to be tested in the analytic
study. In outbreaks where generating the correct
hypothesis is difficult, multiple analytic studies,
with additional hypothesis-generating activities in
between, are sometimes needed before the correct
hypothesis is formed and tested (19).
In interpreting the results of such analytic
studies, one must consider the possibility that
“statistically significant” associations between
one or more exposures and the disease may be
chance findings, not indicative of a true
relationship. By definition, any “statistically
significant” association may have occurred by
chance. (When the standard cut point of p < 0.05
is used, this occurs 5% of the time.) Because many
analytic epidemiologic studies of outbreaks
involve testing many hypotheses, the problem of
“multiple comparisons” arises often.
While there are statistical methods for
adjusting for multiple comparisons, when and
even whether to use them is controversial. At a
minimum, it is important to go beyond the
statistical tests and examine the magnitude of
the effect observed between exposure and disease
(e.g., the odds ratio, relative risk) and the 95%
confidence intervals, as well as biologic plausibil-
ity in deciding whether or not a given
“statistically significant” relationship is likely to
be biologically meaningful. Evidence of a dose-
response effect between a given exposure and
illness (i.e., the greater the exposure, the greater
the risk for illness) makes a causal relationship
between exposure and disease more likely.
Whether the time interval between a given
exposure and onset of illness is consistent with
what is known about the incubation period of the
disease under study must also be assessed. When
illness is “statistically significantly” related to
more than one exposure (e.g., to eating each of
several foods at a common meal), it is important
to determine whether multiple sources of
infection (perhaps due to cross-contamination)
are plausible and whether some of the noted
associations are due to confounding (e.g.,
exposure to one potential source is linked to
exposure to other sources) or to chance.
When trying to decide if a “statistically
significant” exposure is the source of an outbreak,
it is important to consider what proportion of the
cases can be accounted for by that exposure. One
or more of the patients may be classified as
“nonexposed” for various reasons: incorrect
information concerning exposure status (due to
poor memory, language barriers); multiple
sources of exposure or routes of transmission
(perhaps due to cross-contamination); secondary
person-to-person transmission that followed a
common source exposure; or patients without
the suspected exposure, representing back-
ground cases of the disease unrelated to the
outbreak. The plausibility of each of these
explanations varies by outbreak. While there is
no cutoff point above or below which the
proportion of exposed case-patients should fall
before an exposure is thought to account for an
outbreak, the lower this proportion, the less
likely the exposure is, by itself, the source.
Other possibilities need to be considered
when the analytic epidemiologic study finds no
association between the hypothesized exposures
and risk for disease. The most obvious possibility
is that the real exposure was not among those
examined, and additional hypotheses should be
generated. However, other possibilities should
also be considered, particularly when the setting
of the outbreak makes this first explanation
unlikely (e.g., when it is known that those
involved in the outbreak shared only a single
exposure or set of exposures, such as eating a
single common meal). Two other explanations for
failing to find a “statistically significant” link
between one or more exposures and risk for
illness also need to be considered—the number of
persons available for study and the accuracy of
the available information concerning the expo-
sures. Thus, if the outbreak involves only a small
number of cases (and non-ill persons), the
statistical power of the analytic study to find a
true difference in exposure between the ill and
the non-ill (or a difference in the rate of disease
among the exposed and the unexposed) is very
limited. If the persons involved in the outbreak do
not provide accurate information about their
exposure to suspected sources or vehicles of
infection because of lack of knowledge, poor
memory, language difficulty, mental impair-
ment, or other reasons, the resulting
misclassification of exposure status also can26 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 4, No. 1, January–March 1998
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prevent the epidemiologic study from implicating
the source of infection. Studies have documented
that even under ideal circumstances, memory
concerning such exposures is faulty (20). However,
given the usually enormous differences in rates of
disease between those exposed and those not
exposed to the source of the outbreak, even small
studies or studies with substantial misclassification
of exposure can still correctly identify the source.
Environmental Investigation
Samples of foods and beverages served at a
common meal believed to be the source of an
outbreak of gastroenteritis or samples of the
water or drift from a cooling tower believed to be
the source of an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease
can support epidemiologic findings. In the best
scenario, the findings of the epidemiologic
investigation would guide the collection and
testing of environmental samples. However,
environmental specimens often need to be
obtained as soon as possible, either before they
are no longer available, as in the case of residual
food from a common meal, or before environmen-
tal interventions are implemented, as in the case
of treating a cooling tower to eradicate
Legionella. Because laboratory testing of envi-
ronmental samples is often expensive and labor-
intensive, it is sometimes reasonable to collect
and store many samples but test only a limited
number. Collaborating with a sanitarian, envi-
ronmental engineer, or other professional during
an environmental inspection or collection of
specimens is always beneficial.
While finding or not finding the causative
organism in environmental samples is often
perceived by the public, the media, and the courts
as powerful evidence implicating or exonerating
an environmental source, either positive or
negative findings can be misleading for several
reasons. For example, finding Legionella in a
hospital potable water system does not prove that
the potable water (rather than a cooling tower or
some other source) is responsible for an outbreak
of Legionnaires’ disease (21). Similarly, not
finding the causative organism in an environ-
mental sample does not conclusively rule out a
source as the cause of the problem, in part
because the samples obtained and tested may
not represent the source (e.g., because of error
in collecting the specimens, intervening
changes in the environmental source) and in
part because the samples may have been
mishandled. Furthermore, in some outbreaks
caused by well-characterized etiologic agents,
laboratory methods of detecting the agent in
environmental samples are insensitive, techni-
cally difficult, or not available, as in the case of
recent outbreaks of Cyclospora infections associ-
ated with eating imported berries (22,23).
Control Measures
Central to any outbreak investigation is the
timely implementation of appropriate control
measures to minimize further illness and death. At
best, the implementation of control measures
would be guided by the results of the epidemiologic
investigation and possibly (when appropriate) the
testing of environmental specimens. However, this
approach may delay prevention of further exposure
to a suspected source of the outbreak and is,
therefore, unacceptable from a public health
perspective. Because the recall of a food product,
the closing of a restaurant, or similar interventions
can have profound economic and legal implications
for an institution, a manufacturer or owner, and the
employees of the establishments involved, acting
precipitously can also have substantial negative
effects. The recent attribution of an outbreak of
Cyclospora infections to strawberries from Califor-
nia demonstrates the economic impact that can
result from releasing and acting on incorrect
information (22,23). Thus, the timing and nature of
control measures are difficult. Balancing the
responsibility to prevent further disease with the
need to protect the credibility and reputation of an
institution is very challenging.
Interactions with the Public and Press
While the public and the press are not aware
of most outbreak investigations, media attention
and public concern become part of some
investigations. Throughout the course of an
outbreak investigation, the need to share
information with public officials, the press, the
public, and the population affected by the
outbreak must be assessed. While press, radio,
and television reports can at times be inaccurate,
overall the media can be a powerful means of
sharing information about an investigation with
the public and disseminating timely information
about product recalls.
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